Oversight mechanism on Pakistan’s wishlist at Istanbul talks today Azad News HD

Introducing 

 On Friday the Foreign Office of Pakistan voiced a guarded optimism that the new round of bilateral talks with Afghanistan, slated to begin in Istanbul, would yield a significant breakthrough: a verifiable and operational mechanism to monitor and verify the Afghan Taliban’s commitments to prevent militant attacks emanating from Afghan territory into Pakistan. This development comes in the wake of a cease-fire agreement reached in Doha earlier in the week and grows out of mounting frustration in Islamabad over repeated militant incursions, cross-border strikes and the inability to establish a reliable monitoring architecture for the frontier between the two neighbouring countries.

Background: escalation and the Doha truce

The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had deteriorated sharply in the preceding days. Violent exchanges along their roughly 2,600-kilometre border (commonly referred to as the Durand Line) had led to numerous casualties on both sides, with Pakistan consistently accusing militant groups based within Afghan territory of launching attacks into Pakistani soil, and Afghanistan’s Taliban regime denying the allegation or calling for dialogue. Press reports indicate that the scale of the border clashes in early October 2025 represented one of the highest levels of violence between the two neighbours since the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021. 

In response to the escalation, talks were convened in Doha, Qatar, with mediation by Qatar and Türkiye (Turkey). On 19 October 2025, both sides announced a cease‐fire and pledged to work towards “lasting peace and stability.”  The Doha agreement was heralded as a first step — politically significant but operationally undefined. Islamabad’s principal concern was not simply a diplomatic statement, but a concrete mechanism that would guarantee Afghan territory would not continue to be used as a staging ground for attacks on Pakistan. According to the Foreign Office, the talks in Istanbul (scheduled for 25 October 2025) would be the moment to move from words to action. 

Pakistan’s objectives and Pakistan’s security calculus

For Pakistan, the stakes are high. Islamabad argues that any trade, diplomatic or transit relationship with Afghanistan must be grounded in a baseline assurance of security: that militants such as the Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) will no longer use Afghan soil to plan, organise or launch attacks into Pakistan. In Islamabad’s view, the border cannot simply be a friendly trade corridor; it must be an instrument of state security. In his first weekly briefing, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson Tahir Hussain Andrabi said: “We welcome the agreement in Doha … but the next meeting in Istanbul must establish a concrete and verifiable monitoring mechanism.” 

In practical terms, Pakistan is asking for:

• clarity on what constitutes “cross‐border terrorism”, ie an agreed definition;

• real-time intelligence-sharing and coordination between Pakistani and Afghan security agencies;

• mechanisms for verification and independent oversight — possibly involving third parties;

• benchmarks and timelines for dismantling known militant sanctuaries, arresting or expelling key figures, and destroying safe houses;

• effective border control measures, including surveillance, notification of movement, and harmonised action. 

Andrabi emphasised that Pakistan is not asking for the moon: “We are not asking for the moon; we are asking them to uphold commitments.” He said the truce reached in Doha had by and large held, citing that no major militant attack has emanated from Afghan soil in the intervening days. But he underscored that sustaining that ceasefire requires a durable mechanism — otherwise the temporary calm could be misleading.

What the Istanbul round must deliver

The FO spelled out what needs to happen in Istanbul. According to the Dawn newspaper, the goals include finalising a monitoring framework that addresses three main dimensions: terrorism, migration and border security.  Some of the specific agenda items include:

• Mechanism design: Establishing a joint or co-chaired committee (possibly with Qatar and Türkiye as external oversight) that will monitor the Afghan side’s fulfilment of commitments and receive Pakistani concerns.

• Verification measures: Clear metrics and markers — e.g., number of safe houses dismantled, key militant leaders arrested, reduction in cross-border incidents.

• Intelligence sharing and coordination: An operational hotline or coordination centre between Islamabad and Kabul to alert each other of militant movement, suspicious flows, arms trafficking or border infiltration.

• Border management enhancements: Improved surveillance, perhaps joint patrols, better information on border crossings, and harmonised customs/migration controls.

• Dispute resolution and redress: In case of alleged violations, an agreed mechanism for investigation, fact-finding, and remedial action.

• Timeline and accountability: Benchmarks to be reviewed periodically and publicly reported (or at least jointly reported) to build trust and transparency.

In short, Pakistan is seeking to transform the cease-fire into a framework for implementation. The FO believes that Istanbul is the turning point: essentially, the moment where diplomacy either produces something functional or risks reverting to the pattern of unfulfilled promises.

Afghanistan’s perspective and challenges

On the Afghan side, the delegation is being led by Mawlawi Rahmatullah Najeeb, deputy interior minister in the Taliban regime, according to the Turkish news agency Anadolu.  Kabul publicly confirmed the meeting and said remaining issues will be discussed. The Afghan side has its own set of challenges.

Firstly, the Taliban government faces pressure both internally and externally: internally from militant groups inside Afghanistan who might resist crackdown or expulsion, and externally from Pakistan demanding action. Secondly, Kabul has consistently denied that its territory is being used as a base for attacks on Pakistan, noting that it lacks full control over all militant actors, especially in the border regions. (This denial is part of the broader bilateral narrative of mutual accusations.) Thirdly, the Afghan government is under economic stress, concerned about sanctions, isolation, a stalled economy and humanitarian burdens — meaning that diplomatic gains matter, but their capacity to enforce control is constrained.

Thus for the Taliban side, agreeing to a monitoring mechanism is both an opportunity (to improve relations with Pakistan, reopen trade corridors, ease border closures) and a risk (if they are judged to have failed to suppress militants despite internal challenges). The talks in Istanbul therefore will test not just goodwill but capability.

The broader stakes: trade, identity and regional stability

This process has implications far beyond a bilateral security arrangement. When Pakistan demands credible monitoring, it underlines the deeper link between security and economics. Pakistan has already shut major border crossings with Afghanistan in recent days, citing militant attacks near trading points. The Foreign Office noted that when armed attacks take place at trading points, killing Pakistanis, the lives of citizens take precedence over commerce.The disruption of trade raises inflation, supply-chain problems and economic hardship in border provinces.

For Afghanistan, reopening trade routes, ensuring investor confidence, and stabilising its relations with the region are vital. A monitoring mechanism that leads to improved stability would help Kabul secure better economic ties, transit arrangements and possibly greater international legitimacy (even if formal recognition remains a broader diplomatic issue). For both sides, the stakes include how the border is managed, how militants are countered, and how transit trade is stabilised.

In regional terms, the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier is a microcosm of larger themes: the challenge of controlling porous borders, the interplay of non-state armed groups, the difficulty of state control in tribal or mountainous regions, and the necessity of multilateral mediation (Qatar, Türkiye, possibly others such as China) to back up bilateral processes.

Why the mechanism is so critical

The FO’s emphasis on a “verifiable, empirical mechanism” reflects a recognition that prior agreements failed for lack of operational follow-through. The mere declaration of a ceasefire or a joint statement, without agreed verification and accountability, left Pakistan vulnerable to new incursions and allowed the cycle of violence to persist. Islamabad’s position is that until such a mechanism is in place, trade, transit, and broader cooperation cannot be normalised.

Moreover, a credible mechanism would serve multiple functions: deterrence (militant groups know they will be monitored), reassurance (Pakistan knows violations can be addressed), confidence-building (Afghanistan can show action, Pakistan can respond accordingly), and institutionalisation (moving from ad hoc diplomacy to sustained process). For border communities, traders, truck drivers and civilians, this shift offers a chance for sustained peace rather than recurrent panic. Without it, the risk is that the cease-fire will remain fragile, the border closures will recur, and trade will remain unpredictable.

The challenges ahead: implementation obstacles

Despite the best intentions, converting ambition into execution is fraught. Some of the main obstacles include:

• Mutual mistrust: Pakistan and Afghanistan have historically distrusted each other. Afghanistan never formally recognised the Durand Line border; Pakistan accuses Afghan territory of harboring militants. Bridging this chasm of mistrust remains a core hurdle. 

• Weak institutional capacity: The Taliban regime in Afghanistan controls much territory but still faces challenges enforcing control in remote border regions, where local militant groups, tribal networks and cross-border actors operate. This means that even with a mechanism, enforcement may be selective.

• Definition disputes: What exactly counts as a cross-border militant attack? Which groups are to be targeted? How to verify sanctuary or incitement? These definitional issues matter: if Pakistan defines everything as terrorism and Afghanistan defines many actors as “local insurgents”, the mechanism could be deadlocked.

• Third-party oversight sensitivity: Pakistan supports a third-party oversight role (possibly involving Türkiye/Qatar) to increase credibility. But Afghanistan may resist what it sees as external interference or loss of sovereignty.

• Operational transparency vs sovereignty: For monitoring to work, there must be transparency, information sharing and joint response. But both sides may be wary of exposing intelligence or operations.

• Economic vs security trade-offs: Pakistan’s border closures hurt trade. The longer the closure lasts, the greater domestic pressure to resume trade, which could tempt Pakistan into lifting sanctions prematurely. Afghanistan also wants border access. Balancing security demands with economic imperatives is tricky.

• Militant adaptation: Even if the mechanism is established, militant groups may adapt, shift tactics, use deniable means, or retreat deeper into terrain. Monitoring must be dynamic, not static.

Possible outcomes of the Istanbul round

Given the constraints, the Istanbul meeting can give rise to several potential outcomes — each with associated implications.

• Best-case scenario: Pakistan and Afghanistan agree on a clear monitoring mechanism, including a joint technical committee, third-party oversight, timelines, benchmarks, intelligence-sharing protocols and a plan to reopen trade. The border remains calm, trade resumes, and confidence is restored. In this case, the mechanism becomes the foundation for a longer-term peace and transit framework.

• Intermediate scenario: Some progress is made — a joint committee is formed, monitoring modalities are discussed, but key issues (e.g., third-party oversight or specific benchmarks) remain unresolved. Trade remains partially open, but mutual distrust lingers. The mechanism functions in a limited way, maybe on a pilot basis. The cease-fire holds for now, but the risk of disruption remains.

• Worst-case scenario: Talks in Istanbul stall, disagreement over verification or oversight derails the mechanism. No concrete commitments are made, trade remains shut, border-based violence gradually resumes, and the promise of peace turns into yet another temporary lull. The absence of credible monitoring allows militant groups to exploit the gap, and border closures become recurrent, eroding trust and economic opportunity.

Implications of success or failure

If successful

A working mechanism would have major positive implications. For Pakistan, it would relieve a security burden, ease domestic pressure over militant attacks, and allow more stable trade with Afghanistan. For Afghanistan, it would help re-connect transit trade, ease economic isolation, build credibility with neighbours, and reduce pressure on its border provinces. Regionally, it would signal that the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier is no longer a zone of recurrent militarised closure but a corridor of managed transit and cooperation. It could encourage international investors, promote infrastructure on both sides, and deepen regional connectivity (for example transit routes linking Central Asia, South Asia and the Arabian Sea). It would also bolster multilateral mediation roles (Qatar, Türkiye) and perhaps open possibilities for wider regional frameworks — e.g., involving China, Central Asian states and the wider “Heart of Asia” group. 

If unsuccessful

Failure would carry heavy costs. The border trade disruption would persist, economic hardship on both sides — especially in border provinces — would deepen. For Pakistan, rising inflation, supply disruptions and insecurity would become more entrenched; politically, the government may face domestic backlash. For Afghanistan, the closure of transit trade routes would hamper its economy further, exacerbate humanitarian vulnerabilities, weaken its diplomatic standing, and allow militant groups to operate with impunity. Regionally, the frontier would remain a flash-point, deterring investment and undermining connectivity ambitions. The lost credibility of both sides in managing the border could strengthen illicit trade, smuggling and unregulated flows, undermining state authority and governance in the frontier zones.

The human dimension

Beyond policy and diplomacy, this mechanism has very real human consequences. In border towns on the Pakistani side — in provinces like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Balochistan — families depend on cross-border trade, truckers earn their livelihoods ferrying goods, local businesses serve trans-national traffic, and communities straddle the frontier. Similarly on the Afghan side, border provinces rely on commerce, transit, employment and connectivity with Pakistan. When the border is closed or insecure, these communities bear the brunt — price hikes for goods, loss of jobs, stranded transport, and social disruption. The aspiration of a functional monitoring mechanism, therefore, is not just a diplomatic or military matter but one of daily lives. The difference between trade continuing and border closures reoccurring can determine whether a village economy survives or declines.

Linkages to other issues: migration, trade and diplomacy

While the core focus is on security and terrorism, the outcomes of the Istanbul talks tie into wider issues: migration flows, refugee repatriation, transit trade and diplomatic recognition. Migration is relevant because unstable frontiers often generate refugee flows, undocumented movement and humanitarian spill-over. Trade is key because the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is a major transit route and trade corridor — disruptions here ripple into commodity markets, inflation and regional logistics. Diplomatically, the talks offer a chance for Pakistan to deepen engagement with the Taliban regime, for Afghanistan to reduce isolation, and for regional players to position themselves as mediators or stakeholders.

For example, border closures have already been used by Pakistan as leverage: the note that trade would not resume until security improved is a strong message. The FO’s repeated emphasis that “the lives of Pakistanis are more important than any commodity trade” reflects the weighting Pakistan assigns to security over commerce. Yet from a regional viewpoint, sustainable trade requires stability — thus putting pressure on Pakistan to engage seriously with Afghanistan in Istanbul.

The broader strategic context

The talks in Istanbul must also be understood in the geopolitical context. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have been shaped for decades by ethnic ties, border demarcation disputes (Afghanistan has never formally recognised the Durand Line), militant sanctuaries, proxy wars, and strategic rivalry. The Taliban’s ascendancy in 2021 reconfigured the relationship, as Pakistan sought to recalibrate its approach toward a new Kabul. The border has become more than a frontier; it is now a strategic fault-line. The shift from viewing the border purely as a trade corridor to treating it also as a security frontier is central to Pakistan’s current posture — and the Istanbul mechanism is a manifestation of that shift.

Furthermore, Türkiye’s mediation role and Qatar’s involvement indicate how regional players are increasingly engaged in South-Central Asian security dynamics. The monitoring mechanism, if it dimensionally involves third-party oversight, could mark a new model of multilateral border governance in South Asia: one where neighbours with trust deficits adopt institution-based solutions rather than purely bilateral commitments.

A moment of choice

As the meeting in Istanbul opens, Pakistan is signalling that this is a moment of choice: either a new chapter of structured cooperation or a return to the old cycle of cease-fires, violence, closures and reopenings. The Foreign Office’s messaging is deliberate: they emphasise sincerity of the Pakistani delegation, hope for an operational mechanism, and readiness to resume full relations only once that mechanism is in place. 

At the same time, Pakistan acknowledges the benefits of peace and stable relations: trade flows, economic cooperation, border development. But security remains the non‐negotiable starting point. The Foreign Office spokesperson reiterated that Pakistan approaches the Istanbul round with the same sincerity of purpose which it brought to Doha. 

Final thoughts

The decision by the Foreign Office to emphasise the Istanbul round as the place to institutionalise the monitoring mechanism reflects both realism and urgency. Realism because Pakistan recognises that mere statements will not suffice; urgency because each day of unresolved border tension carries costs — in lives lost, economic disruption and regional instability.

If the Istanbul talks produce the mechanism Pakistan envisions — clear, verifiable, operational — then the bilateral relationship might transition from episodic crisis management toward sustained cooperation. The border could gradually transform from a flash-point into a corridor of regulated connectivity. The economic dynamic could help stabilize border provinces, restore trade, ease domestic pressures in Pakistan and relieve economic burdens in Afghanistan.

Conversely, if the talks falter and the mechanism remains vague or ineffective, the risk is that the current lull will be short-lived. Border closures may recur, militant groups may exploit the vacuum, communities will again suffer and the cycle of tension will deepen. For Pakistan and Afghanistan alike, the Istanbul mechanism is not just a diplomatic side-issue — it is central to shaping the future of their relations, the security of the frontier and the prospects for cooperation.

In summary, the Foreign Office’s hope is clear: the fresh round of talks in Istanbul must yield more than words — they must yield architecture. A monitoring mechanism that holds meaning, that is not easily circumvented, and that allows Islamabad to trust that Afghan territory will no longer be used for attacks against it. For Pakistan, security first; for Afghanistan, the chance to restore connectivity; for the region, a test of whether conflict-prone frontiers can become managed corridors.

Until such a mechanism is in place, every delay, every incident, every unanswered question reminds both sides that the promise of peace remains tentative. And for the communities that live on the border — traders, drivers, families whose lives depend on stable crossing points — the difference between a working mechanism and its absence is very real: safety, livelihood, normalcy.

Thus, as the Istanbul dialogue begins, both capitals will be watching. Not just the optics of handshake pictures; but the operational details: how monitoring will be done, how verification will function, how sanctions or redress will work, how trade will reopen, and how trust will be rebuilt. The next chapters of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations may depend on whether this mechanism becomes a living reality — or remains another agreement on paper.

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