TLP declared Banned outfit, added to First Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act Azad News HD
Introduction
In a dramatic and sweeping move, the Government of Pakistan has officially declared Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) to be a proscribed organisation under Section 11B(1)(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997. The notification cites “reasonable grounds” to believe that the group is “connected with and concerned in terrorism.” This step marks a decisive measure against a hard-line religio-political party which, for years, has positioned itself at the interface between electoral politics, Islamist populism, extra-legal protest mobilisation and confrontational street-action. This article examines what led to this decision, the relevant law, the history of TLP’s rise, what the proscription means in practice, the immediate and medium-term implications for politics, security, rule-of-law and whether this could indeed mark what some commentators term the “final nail in the coffin” of TLP’s mainstream political ambitions.
Legal Framework: What Does the Anti-Terrorism Act Provide?
To understand the significance of the action, it’s essential first to register the legal basis: the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA) was enacted “to provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.”
Under Section 11B of the ATA, specifically Subsection (1)(a), the federal government is empowered to declare an organisation to be “proscribed” and list it in the First Schedule of the Act if the Government has “reasonable grounds to believe” that the organisation is “concerned in terrorism”. For instance, prior analyses mention that Section 11B(1) empowers listing an organisation “if there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is: concerned with terrorism; owned or controlled … by an individual or organisation proscribed under the ATA; or acting on behalf or on the directives of an individual or organisation proscribed under the ATA.”
Once an organisation is proscribed, the authorities may take a range of measures: sealing its offices, seizing its publications and funds, banning its public utterances, freezing assets, and bringing individuals associated under extra-legal or special procedures.
The law also allows for de-proscription under Section 11U: an organisation may apply to the Government for removal from the First Schedule after a period if it can show that the reasons for its proscription have ceased.
Thus, the Government’s move to list TLP under Section 11B(1)(a) is not simply symbolic but carries legal force: it converts TLP from a party operating within Pakistan’s political-legal framework into an organisation legally treated as a terrorist-affiliated entity.
Who is TLP? – Origins, Ideology, Mobilisation
The organisation in question, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, emerged in August 2015 under the leadership of the late Khadim Hussain Rizvi and later under his successor Saad Hussain Rizvi. It is widely regarded as a far-right Islamist populist party that draws heavily on Barelvi-Sunni traditions, vehement defence of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, and mass mobilisation tactics. Its rhetoric emphasises Sharia implementation, populist religious posture, critique of secular elites, and sometimes vigilante enforcement of moral and religious norms.
What makes TLP distinct is the fusion of electoral politics with street-mobilisation: it has contested elections, garnered millions of votes, and simultaneously led large-scale protests, sit-ins, long marches and confrontations with the state. Its tactics include public threats, blocking of roads, mass gatherings, and at times violent outbursts when its demands are unmet
For example, in April 2021, TLP protests erupted after the arrest of Saad Rizvi, resulting in several days of violent protest — including deaths of policemen, injuries to many, and the party being banned the next day by the federal government. The government’s notification in that earlier ban said TLP “acted in a manner prejudicial to the peace and security of the country … intimidated the public… attacked civilians and officials … vandalised public and government properties … blocked essential health supplies to hospitals…”
Thus, the history of TLP is one of oscillation between politics and protest, party formation and radical activism, electoral contestation and street coercion.
What Led to the Latest Proscription?
The recent ban (as of October 2025) appears to be propelled by multiple interlocking developments:
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Escalating Demonstrations and Violence
In recent months, TLP has led major protests — notably around Gaza, foreign policy and domestic religious issues — that involved road blockades, mass mobilisation, disruption of public order, violent clashes with law-enforcement, and attempts to coerce the state into concessions. According to a news report, Pakistan’s cabinet approved a summary on 23 October 2025 proposing the ban after TLP “violent and terrorist activities.” -
State Fatigue and Frustration
The Pakistani government has repeatedly faced TLP’s capacity to force its hand via protest. This has included earlier deals, negotiated truces, and de-facto immunity for some of its actions. But the repeated pattern of disruption likely pushed the state towards a firmer stance — the “final straw” being a protest episode deemed intolerable. -
Security and Governance Imperatives
The state’s decision-makers may have judged that TLP’s pattern of protest, intimidation and coercion crosses the threshold from political dissent into organised extremist activity. By invoking “reasonable grounds to believe … connected with and concerned in terrorism,” the government is framing TLP not only as an extremist party but as one whose methods and behaviour meet the terrorism standard in the ATA. The earlier notification in 2021 cited similar grounds. -
Legal Trigger under the ATA
Because the ATA allows listing of organisations which “engage in acts prejudicial to the defence or security of Pakistan or the maintenance of public order” (implicitly) and can be seen as “terrorist acts,” the government evidently believes that TLP has crossed that threshold. Given the 2021 precedent, the state has the legal formula to proscribe the party under Section 11B(1)(a).
Taken together, these dynamics set the stage for what many analysts now see as a potentially irreversible proscription of TLP from mainstream politics.
Proscription Effects: What Happens When TLP is Listed?
With the party now declared a proscribed organisation under the ATA, the immediate and practical implications are substantial:
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Legal Status Change: TLP’s offices, assets, bank accounts, publications, propaganda materials, affiliated organisations may be sealed, frozen or confiscated under the law. The government may seek to bring its members under anti-terror investigation.
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Political Participation: Although the ban deals with the organisation as an entity, questions arise whether its members can continue to contest elections under alternative labels, or whether the party’s dissolution will lead to de-facto freeze of its electoral machinery. Earlier the 2021 ban included notification of dissolution under the Election Act.
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Criminalisation of Membership and Support: Under ATA proceedings, affiliation with a proscribed organisation invites criminal liability. The terror-financing, membership, support, meetings, funds of a proscribed entity become subject to anti-terror sanctions.
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Public Order & State Action: The government can now act more forcefully against protest actions by the group, block its gatherings, and use the terrorism frame rather than treating it purely as a political party. This may raise the threshold for protest and increase risk of arrest, asset seizures and criminal prosecution of leaders.
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Negotiation Leverage Reduced: In past episodes, the state negotiated with TLP in crisis (e.g., protests) and gave concessions. With the ban in place, the party loses some bargaining power and the state signals zero-tolerance for its coercive tactics.
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International and Domestic Signalling: The proscription signals to domestic constituencies, security structures and the international community that Pakistan is treating a familiar but unruly actor as part of its counter-terrorism regime rather than as a mere party. This could impact foreign-aid, global assessments of extremism, and the credibility of Pakistan’s counter-terror efforts.
In short, the listing transforms the contest from one of politics and protest to one of law-enforcement and counter-terrorism.
Is This the Final Nail in the Coffin of TLP?
The expression “final nail in the coffin” suggests that TLP’s prospects of operating as a mainstream political actor are effectively ended. The question is whether this proscription truly achieves that, or whether the party can adapt or mutate. Below are considerations:
Factors in favour of “ended” status:
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Legal Hammer: The proscription gives the state powerful tools to disable the organisation structurally. If the party’s assets are frozen, leadership shut down, offices sealed, the organisational capacity diminishes.
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Political Isolation: As a banned entity, TLP faces isolation from formal politics, alliances, campaign funding, and legitimate social status. Voters, donors and activists may pivot elsewhere.
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Loss of Leverage: TLP’s modus operandi has been mass protest that forced the state’s hand. If the state refuses to negotiate and treats them as a terror entity, the party’s leverage shrinks.
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Public Perception: If the public associates TLP with “terrorism,” “violation of public order,” “intimidation,” and sees government crack-down, the brand may suffer. The party may lose moderates, lose legitimacy.
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Opportunity for Alternatives: Other religious parties or populist movements may fill the space that TLP vacates, attracting its supporters but offering less confrontational methods.
Factors suggesting resilience or adaptation:
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Mass Base and Mobilisation Capacity: TLP has demonstrated strong mobilisation capabilities, large numbers of supporters, street presence and a social-mobilisation infrastructure. A ban may slow it but not destroy it overnight.
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Embedding in Localities: The party’s networks in rural areas, among protesters, madrassa-linked activists may continue to operate underground or morph into allied groups.
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Rebranding or Proxy Organisations: Facing a ban, TLP’s leadership or sympathisers may create new organisations, rename the party, contest elections under new label, operate through “civil society”, “religious welfare” fronts, etc.
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Negotiated Return: Pakistan’s political history shows that banned groups have sometimes been brought back into the fold through negotiations. If TLP offers to moderate, the state may permit re-entry under conditions.
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Ideological Appeal: The issues TLP embodies (blasphemy laws, Islamic populism, religious nationalism, anti-West sentiment) resonate with segments of society. Even if the formal party dissolves, the ideological space remains.
Thus, while the proscription is a decisive blow, the ultimate fate of TLP depends on follow-through: enforcement, dismantling of infrastructure, political alternatives, and whether the state sustains its strategy or reverts to accommodation.
Wider Political and Security Implications
The decision to ban TLP under anti-terror law is not merely a tactical move; it has broader ramifications for Pakistan’s politics, civil-military relations, governance and security environment.
Politico-electoral implications
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Religious-Party Landscape: TLP’s ban leaves a void in the religious-populist right segment of the electorate. Other parties may attempt to capture its supporters, altering electoral dynamics.
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Mainstream Parties’ Strategy: Parties of the centre and the right will need to reassess strategies: whether to engage or contest TLP’s constituency, whether to adopt or reject its rhetoric, whether to distance themselves more from zealot-populism.
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Coalition Politics: In a fragmented electoral environment, TLP had been both a disruptive force and a wildcard for coalition building. Its absence may reduce volatility but also reduce bargaining leverage of religious blocs.
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State-Parties Relationship: The banning sends a message to other parties that the state may intervene if a party resorts to mass coercive tactics. This could encourage moderation or push parties underground.
Governance and rule-of-law implications
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Precedent-setting for Proscriptions: Listing a major political party under terrorism law raises questions around political dissent, civil liberties and the boundary between protest and terrorism. Legal scholars warn of risks to democratic space.
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Enforcement Mechanism: The effectiveness of the ban depends on the capacity of law enforcement, intelligence, judiciary and regulatory agencies to monitor, act and prosecute. Pakistan’s past experience with ATA has had mixed results.
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Counter-Extremism Strategy: The move potentially strengthens the state’s counter-terrorism posture by applying it consistently to Islamist parties, rather than only to non-state militant actors. It may also deter future coercive protest mobilisation.
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Risk of Backlash: Conversely, taking a hard line may provoke backlash, radicalise segments of TLP’s base, lead to underground insurgency, or prompt retaliatory large scale protests. The state must be ready to manage that.
Security and societal implications
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Public Order and Stability: The banning aims to restore the monopoly of the state over coercion and protest, reduce instances of road-blockades, long-marches, violent disruption of essential services (which TLP has engaged in).
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Shrinking Safe Space for Extremist Populism: As TLP’s operations become illegal, other groups may think twice before employing street coercion, thereby raising the cost of extremist mobilisation.
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Human Rights & Civil Liberties: The flip side is risk of over-reach: when political groups are banned under terrorism laws, state powers expand (asset-freezing, closures, investigations). Oversight and safeguards become critical to maintaining rule-of-law. Amnesty International’s critique of the ATA is relevant here.
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Deradicalisation & Integration: The ban opens an opportunity for reintegration of TLP’s cadre into mainstream political or civic life, if managed carefully, to avoid creating a radicalised underground.
Challenges and Risks in Implementation
Proscribing an organisation is one thing; operationalising the proscription is another. Some of the key challenges include:
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Legal Ambiguity & Rights Concerns: The standard of “reasonable grounds to believe” is broad and may lead to litigation over due process, fairness, freedom of association. The balance between counter-terror measures and rights is delicate.
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Monitoring and Intelligence Capacity: To enforce the ban, the state needs strong intelligence on TLP’s leadership, finances, affiliate networks, and must track any evolution into proxy groups. Given Pakistan’s multiple security challenges, this is a heavy task.
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Political Backlash & Public Sentiment: Given that TLP draws on religious populist sentiment, banning it risks alienating large segments of society who may view the state’s action as targeted at religion rather than extremist kinetics. Managing narrative is crucial.
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Underground Radicalisation or Fractionalisation: A banned party may fracture, with hard-liners forming militant offshoots, or join other extremist networks. The state must monitor such spill-overs.
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Alternative Mobilisation Channels: TLP might shift from open rallies to cyberspace, youth networks, madrassa outreach or even inter-provincial mobilisation, which makes enforcement harder.
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Election Laws & Succession Politics: If TLP’s electoral wing is banned but its voters remain, their political energy may be channeled into other parties or extremist formations. The state must ensure representation is not suppressed entirely, else risk disenfranchisement.
What Comes Next? A Roadmap for the State, Civil Society and Voters
Given the drastic nature of the ban, it is useful to outline what the next steps should be to ensure a successful, balanced outcome.
For the State & Security Agencies
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Comprehensive Enforcement Plan: The government should publish and implement a clear roadmap for shutting down TLP’s infrastructure: offices, propaganda networks, finances, front-organisations, and monitor whether any groups emerge to replace it.
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Asset-Freezing & Financial Tracking: Implement financial investigations into TLP’s funding, donations, affiliated businesses, foreign flows, and confiscate or freeze accordingly under the ATA.
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Legal-Judicial Follow-through: Major cases against TLP leaders and activists should be brought in courts (preferably fair, transparent and within rule-of-law benchmarks) to affirm that the ban is not merely symbolic but has tangible legal consequence.
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Preventive Counter-Mobilisation: Prevent large protest marches or coercive mobilisation by pre-emptively engaging with protest threats, enforcing Section 144, coordinating with provincial and federal agencies, and maintaining public order with minimal force.
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Reintegration Strategy: For rank-and-file supporters who may not be ideologically militant but part of TLP’s voter base, the state should consider avenues of political or civic engagement rather than allowing disenfranchisement to foster radicalisation.
For Political Parties & Civil Society
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Inclusion of Religious-Conservative Voters: Other mainstream parties must engage seriously with the grievances and identity factors that drove voters to TLP: e.g., religious law sentiment, moral populism, anti-establishment anger. Offering legitimate, peaceful channels is key.
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Dialogue & Deradicalisation: Civil society should work to engage former TLP activists, youth wings, madrassa networks, to incorporate them into non-violent civic or political frameworks and discourage transition into extremist offshoots.
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Media & Public Narrative: The ban needs to be explained in terms of rule-of-law and public safety, not as anti-religious. Media and civil society should monitor state action to ensure it does not overreach and that human rights are respected.
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Political Alternatives & Platforms: New or existing parties that can absorb the legitimate concerns of TLP’s constituency (blasphemy law defenders, religious conservatism, moral populism) but commit to democratic and peaceful means should be encouraged to open space for those voters.
For the Citizen-Voter and Society at Large
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Civic Vigilance: Citizens should remain alert to the possibility of TLP “shadow networks” or re-labelled front groups seeking to operate illegally. Reporting and public oversight help.
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Empathy and Inclusion: Many TLP supporters are economically marginalised, emotionally invested in identity politics, or disillusioned with mainstream parties. Addressing their needs – employment, representation, dignity – helps prevent radicalisation.
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Democratic Engagement: Voters must hold mainstream parties accountable for articulating religious/populist concerns in lawful ways; this supresses the “only TLP speaks for me” narrative.
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Education & Tolerance: Promoting religious understanding, tolerance of minorities, and awareness of the dangers of coercive protest-politics can help build social resilience against extremist mobilisation.
Potential Outcomes and Scenarios
Let us imagine three broad scenarios, ranging from worst-case to best-case, to assess how events might unfold.
Scenario A: Ban Works — TLP is Marginalised
In this scenario, the government enforces the ban stringently: TLP offices are sealed, finances cut, leaders arrested or kept under supervision, new proxy entities crushed or discouraged. The party’s electoral infrastructure collapses, its supporters migrate to other parties, or withdraw from politics. The religious-populist vote is redistributed, and Pakistan’s religious-party landscape becomes less volatile. Street-mobilisation by extremist religious forces declines. This would indeed look like the “final nail in the coffin” of TLP as an actor.
Scenario B: Ban Backfires — TLP Goes Underground or Radicalises
Here, the ban weakens TLP’s formal political presence but does not diminish its popular support. The party fractures: some moderate leaders cooperate with state, others go underground. A militant off-shoot emerges, or the protest base radicalises. TLP voters feel disenfranchised and shift toward anti-establishment militancy. The state now fights a covert insurgency rather than open party politics. This outcome would be worse than before.
Scenario C: Conditional Re-Inclusion — TLP Negotiated Back
In this outcome, after some months of pressure, the state offers a conditional path for TLP’s re-registration – but only if it accepts reform: disavow violent protest, break with coercive mobilisation, register as a normal party with internal democracy, financial transparency, and abide by the law. TLP may accept a diluted role in exchange for legitimacy. It thus survives but in a transformed, less confrontational form. The party does not vanish but changes its character. This could be a middle path.
Which scenario prevails depends on the state’s consistency, the party’s adaptability, and the broader political environment.
Why the Timing Might Be Critical
Several contextual factors make this moment particularly important:
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Election Cycle Dynamics: Pakistan is navigating a period of electoral politics in which religious-populist parties have increasing appeal. TLP’s ban ahead of elections could reshape this field.
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Regional Security Pressure: Pakistan’s broader counter-terrorism agenda, international partnerships (e.g., FATF, US-Pakistan relations) and credibility in reducing extremism may have motivated a firmer stance.
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Domestic Governance Stress: With economic strains, inflation, governance fatigue and law-and-order challenges, the state may lack patience for recurrent mass protests that impose cost and disruption.
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Ideological Contestation: The ban marks a potential turning point in the state-religion nexus: whether religious populist coercion remains a tolerated part of party politics or is pushed into marginality.
The convergence of these factors suggests the state judged this a strategic moment to act: to pre-empt, not just respond, to religious-populist crisis.
The Bigger Picture: Religious Populism, State Power and Pakistan’s Political Trajectory
To understand the proscription of TLP, one must situate it in the broader narrative of religious populism and state power in Pakistan.
TLP represents a new wave of religion-based party that mobilises via identity, indignation, street muscle and moral rhetoric rather than conventional political organisation. According to research, the party “rides the populist wave by speaking to the fears and anxieties of the public… mainstreamed radical Islamist and pro-violence ideas.”
For decades Pakistan’s religious-political formations have operated in complex relation with the state: at times tolerated, at times co-opted, at times confronted. TLP’s rise signalled a challenge: a religious populist force that did not simply ally with the establishment, but coerced it via mass action. The state’s tolerance of this pattern may have reached a breaking point; the ban may represent the state re-asserting its monopoly on coercion and the boundaries of permissible protest.
If this is a watershed moment, the question will be: can Pakistan chart a path where religious voices are integrated into politics without resorting to mass coercion, extra-legal protest or street-insurrection? Or will the ban drive dissent underground and radicalise it? The answer will shape Pakistan’s political trajectory for years to come.
Concluding Reflections
The decision to proscribe Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan under Section 11B(1)(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act is a landmark in Pakistan’s political and security history. It elevates what has been a violent, disruptive, and populist religious party into the domain of national security, formally treating its conduct as terrorism rather than mere political dissent. Whether this constitutes the “final nail in the coffin” of TLP depends on the implementation, follow-up, political alternatives, and the state’s capacity to manage both enforcement and inclusion of its constituency.
If the ban is enforced rigorously, backed by consistent politics, the party’s organisational capacity may be disabled, its protest-machinery dismantled, and its ability to coerce the state reduced. In that case, one can credibly say that TLP’s era as a mainstream coercive Islamist actor is ending. However, if enforcement is weak, or if the party finds a way to re-emerge under another banner, or if the state swings back to negotiation rather than confrontation, the outcome may be more ambiguous.
For Pakistan, the stakes are high: the ban raises hope of ending a recurring crisis of coercive religious politics and restoring a more stable political-legal order. At the same time, it demands caution: the state must uphold rule-of-law, avoid alienating large segments of the population, and offer legitimate spaces for religious-political engagement without resorting to extra-legal coercion.
